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Service (DAAD) is gratefully acknowledged.Bagehot (1873) insisted that there should exist a precise rule, which determines, under which
conditions illiquid banks should be closed or not. Nonetheless, regulators do not pursue a strategy
of commitment to either the liquidation or the bailout of failing banks. Bennett (2001) writes that
a ni n s o l v e n tb a n ki sm o r el i k e l yt oc o n t i n u et oo perate in developing economies or economies
in transition: one half of local banking regulators in this group have allowed insolvent banks to
operate, whereas 3 of the 14 deposit insurers in advanced economies have done so. In general, 35%
of respondents (10 out of 28) did not deny the practice of allowing equity-insolvent depository
institutions to operate for extended periods. Just one example in this connection is that during a 4
year period (1988-92) the FDIC allowed the insolvent First City Bancorporation (with 59 branches
in USA) to operate through open bank assistance ,a n do n l yi n1 9 9 2d i dt h e recurring losses of
the bank led to its closure. Santomero and Hoffman (1998) also note that regulators often delay
resolution actions in the hope of a turnaround.
A commitment to a prompt corrective action (PCA), which requires an immediate closure
of an insolvent institution, creates limited liability of banks. Although the literature on limited
liability in economics is relatively large (see, for example, the review by Noe and Smith, 1997), its
applications to banking are scarce. The research focuses mostly on the ideas that limited liability
can give the bankers incentives to take on too much risk (e.g. Gollier, Koehl and Rochet, 1996)
and/or lead to the excessive interest rates if intermediation is competitive (e.g. Matutes and Vives,
2000). Other effects of limited liability as well as the question to what extent the principle of
limited liability holds in practice, suffer a certain lack of attention.
Sinn (2003) deﬁnes unlimited liability as the case, in which "banks will always keep their
promises", but adds that "unlimited liability is far from being realistic, given that no one can lose
more than he has." In a static context, this is obvious. Indeed, consider for an instance a standard
two-period setting. In the ﬁrst period, a depositor decides whether to deposit with the bank or not,
while the bank decides upon its investment portfolio. In the second period, two states of nature
are possible: either the bank is solvent or not. If the bank is solvent, the depositor is repaid in
full. If the bank is insolvent, the depositor can ber e p a i dw i t hn om o r et h a nt h ev a l u eo ft h eb a n k ’ s
2portfolio. In this world, there is no place for unlimited liability, which supports the above idea of
Sinn (2003).
Consider now a world with overlapping generations, where the bank can exist for many
periods. In each period, a new generation of depositors decides upon depositing with the bank.
Over a period, two states of nature are possible: either the bank is solvent or not. If the bank is
solvent, old depositors are repaid in full. However, if the bank is insolvent, it can still be liquid due
to the deposits acquired from the new generation of depositors. Old depositors can be repaid from
these newly acquired funds. This would be the case of unlimited liability. The question is whether
the insolvent bank is allowed to repay to the old depositors.
These two examples show that a PCA may have disatvantages compared to the forbearance,
since the latter eliminates limited liability and some problems related to it. At the same time,
it is unclear, whether a broader ambiguity in the regulator’s policy may be advantageous. The
term "constructive ambiguity" was made popular by Gerald Corrigan (1990) while he was the
President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank. Enoch, Stella and Khamis (1997) summarize
the key arguments for and against the ambiguity and formally deﬁne that constructive ambiguity
is maintained with regards to how, when and whether the regulators will employ their safety nets.
Applied to banks, this concerns the methods of the failure resolutions, the timing of the resolution,
and the commitment to a certain rule. In this sense, regulatory forbearance may be seen as a
part of the constructive ambiguity policy, which relates to the delays in insolvency resolutions.
The current paper presents a simpliﬁed general equilibrium framework to analyze the equilibrium
effects of ambiguity and forbearance in bank insolvency resolutions.
There are three major strands of the literature, to which the current paper relates. First,
the paper addresses the issue of the efﬁciency of ﬁnancial intermediation in linking creditors and
borrowers and thus contributes to the research comparing ﬁnancial systems. Benston and Smith
(1976) show that in presence of transaction costs, which prevent the access of agents to ﬁnan-
cial markets, ﬁnancial intermediaries can re-establish the link between creditors and borrowers.
Diamond (1984) introduces the monitoring function of banks to demonstrate how the intermedi-
ated economy may achieve an optimal allocation of ressources. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)
3examine the comparative allocational efﬁciencies of bank-based versus market based economies.
Boot and Thakor (1997) study the question of ﬁnancial system architecture and show that banking
systems replace markets if the latter are informationally underdevelopped. Most of the studies
imlicitly or explicitly assume proper banking regulation to assist the allocational efﬁciency of ﬁ-
nancial intermediation. The current paper uses the allocational efﬁciency approach to develop
arguments for a better design of insolvency regulation in banking sector.
Second, the paper studies the effects of bailouts-liquidation policy of the banking regulator.
On the one hand, it is argued that bailing out banks, like ﬂat-rate deposit insurance, may lead to
excessive risk taking by them (see e.g. Davies and McManus, 1991). On the other hand, ﬁre
sells may lead to a decrease in the bank’s liquidation value (see e.g. James, 1991, and Schleifer
and Vishny, 1992), which makes prompt liquidations suboptimal. Freixas (2000) employs a cost-
beneﬁt analysis to demonstrate that the optimal regulation should combine bailouts and liquidation
in a stochastic way. Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) and Rochet and Vives (2004) show that
bailouts might be optimal since coordination failures may prevent illiquid but solvent banks from
borrowing liquid funds in the market. However, this argument fails, if one considers closures
of insolvent but liquid institutions, like those reported by Bennett (2001) as examples of delays
in insolvency resolutions. The current paper considers the limited liability aspect of the bailout-
liquidation policy and shows that the closure of such banks is not always optimal. Moreover, the
stochastic liquidation rule à la Freixas (2000) only provides for an efﬁcient allocation of funds in
an intermediated economy, if banks internalize insolvency costs.
Finally, thispapercontributestotheliteratureinpoliticalambiguityandforbearance. Cukier-
man and Meltzer (1986) suggested one of the ﬁrst models to encompass the ambiguity in monetary
policy. Alesina and Cukierman (1990) study the role of ambiguity in electoral processes. The lit-
erature on constructive ambiguity in ﬁnancial sector is scarce. Freixas (2000) and Shim (2005)
argue in favor of a stochastic bailout rule. Kocherlakota and Shim (2006) ﬁnd that the choice
between forbearance and PCA depends crucially on the properties of the stochastic process gov-
erning the value of the collateral behind the defaulting credit. Kahl (2002) discusses forbearance
with regards to ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress and shows that forbearance may be justiﬁed through the
4need of the ﬁrm’s creditors to obtain better information about the ﬁrm’s viability. All these papers
study the optimality of closure policy from the point of view of the party, which is responsible
for the closure. The decision-making of the institution in ﬁnancial distress is seen as though the
latter is aware of the probability of closure. Even if the distressed institution is not well informed,
its decision-making is governed by a subjective probability distribution or beliefs with regards to
the closure policy. In contrast to these studies, the current paper offers a framework, in which
two groups of agents (depositors and bankers) face ambiguity. In this case, their beliefs must not
be identical. The asymmetry in beliefs may drastically change the equilibrium outcome, making
the equilibrium allocation of funds in the intermediated economy signiﬁcantly different from that
in the market economy. This supports the idea that the "constructive ambiguity" and forbearance
should rather take a stochastic form with the regulator informing the public on the properties of
the probability distribution chosen, than bias towards unpredictability and intransparency.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the macroeconomic environment, which
is common for both market and intermediated economies. Section II presents the macroeconomic
equilibrium in the market economy, which serves as the reference point for further analysis. Sec-
tion III introduces ﬁnancial intermediation into the model and discusses the stochastic bailout
policy of the regulator. In Section IV the policy of forbearance is studied, and Section V presents
an analysis of ambiguos closure policy. The paper concludes with a summary of results.
I. Macroeconomic Environment
Consider an economy with overlapping generations consisting of a continuum of agents who live
for two periods. Generation t is born in the beginning of period t and is endowed with a unit
amount of the consumption-investment good. This generation is young in period t,b e c o m e so l di n
the beginning of period t +1a n dd i e si nt h ee n do fp e r i o dt +1 . In each period, one generation is
born.
Each generation consists of potential entrepreneurs and of consumers. It is convenient to
normalize the mass of each group of agents to unity. Entrepreneurs differ from consumers in
5t h a tt h ef o r m e rh a v ea c c e s s to a production technology Ψ, and the latter do not. The production
technology is risky and has a constant state-contingent return to scale. In each period t +1 ,o n e
of two states of nature st+1, "H" or "L", is possible, and if kt units of good are invested in period
t, the production technology delivers rHkt units of good in "H"-state of nature and rLkt units of
good in "L"-state of nature in period t +1 :
Ψ(kt,st+1)=
½
rHkt if st+1 = H
rLkt if st+1 = L (1)
The probability of "H"-state of nature is p and is constant over time. The state-contingent gross
rates of return rF and rL, induced by the production technology are also constant over time.
The assumption of a constant return to scale is equivalent to a standard assumption of a risky
asset yielding two different rates of return in two different states of nature. The introduction of
entrepreneurs is only needed to provide more intuition on the funds channelling from creditors to
borrowers.
Furthermore, there exists also a storage technology, which allows one to transfer funds from
period t into period t+1, and yields a risk-free rate of return rF, which is also constant over time.








H +( 1− p)r
L >r
F (3)
The ﬁrst assumption guarantees that neither technology dominates another one ap r i o r i .T h e
secondassumptionstates thatthe productiontechnology dominates thestoragetechnologyin terms
of expected values.T h ee x i s t e n c eo ft h es t o r a g e( r i s k - f r e ea sset) combined with the risky rechnol-
ogyensures thatthe market is complete, as soonas bothassetsare available fortrade. Ina complete
market, the equilibrium allocation of funds is Pareto-optimal and may serve as a reference point
for a further comparison.
Finally, assume that all agents are risk-neutral and only care about their consumption when
old. This reduces their decision-making to maximization of investment gains. The assumption of
6risk-neutrality is notcrucialforthe studyofallocational efﬁciency. Itisimportantthat ifconsumers
wishtocomposeaportfolioofriskyandrisk-freeassetsinthemarketeconomy, theyshouldbeable
to have a portfolio with the same properties in the intermediated economy. So if the intermediated
systemis able toprovide foranoptimal allocationof funds, itshould be able to doitfor risk-neutral
agents as well.
II. Market Economy
Assume there exists a market place in which potential entrepreneurs and consumers can negotiate
at no costs. Entrepreneurs offer consumers an opportunity to share the usage of the production
technology. Entrepreneurs charge consumers with a proportional fee γt ≥ 0 for the access to the
production technology. As a result, if a consumer delivers xt units of the good to an entrepreneur,
only (1 − γt)xt units are invested on behalf of the consumer, while the rest of γtxt belongs to the
entrepreneur.
Hence, each entrepreneur possesses a total of mt =1+γtxt units of good for investment
and has an opportunity to invest a share yt of it into the risky production technology, and the share
(1 − yt) into the storage technology with no risk. The entrepreneurs maximize the proﬁtt h e y
expect to obtain in period t +1 :
Et+1 = pr
Hyt (1 + γtxt)+( 1− p)r
Lyt (1 + γtxt)
+r
F(1 − yt)(1+γtxt)




s.t. xt ≥ 0
0 ≤ yt ≤ 1









{∞} if γt > 0
[0;∞) if γt =0 (6)
Here xd
t denotes the demand of entrepreneurs for external funds, which depends on the fee





t (γt)di = xd
t (γt) is also indeﬁnite
under any positive fee γt.
1
Consumers decide upon the allocation of their unit endowment of funds in the following
parts: xt for the production technology, which is accessible thank to entrepreneurs, and (1 − xt)
for the safe storage technology. Given the fee, γt, charged by entrepeneurs, the expected gains of
consumers are
Gt+1 = pr
H (1 − γt)xt +( 1− p)r
L(1 − γt)xt + r
F(1 − xt)




s.t. 0 ≤ xt ≤ 1







{0} if γt >
prH+(1−p)rL−rF
prH+(1−p)rL
[0;1] if γt =
prH+(1−p)rL−rF
prH+(1−p)rL
{1} if γt <
prH+(1−p)rL−rF
prH+(1−p)rL








t (γt)di = x
s
t (γt)
Now we can ﬁnd the temporary equilibrium in the market economy for any period t.
Deﬁnition 1 Temporary equilibrium in period t is an allocation of funds X∗








It is easy to see that under a strictly positive fee γt the demand for external funds from
1 Since all entrepreneurs are equal, I omit index i related to an individual entrepreneur everywhere in the
text. The appearance of i in the integration only aims to show that we sum individial demands over all entrepreneurs.
8e n t r e p r e n e u r si si n ﬁnitely high, but the supply of funds from consumers is limited to unity. The
only possibility for the equilibrium is γ∗
t =0 , which means that entrepreneurs provide consumers
with a free of charge access to the production technology. At the same time, the equilibrium
allocation of funds is X∗
t =1 , which means that consumers invest their whole initial endowment
in the risky technology. This equilibrium constellation does not depend on the index of period t,
and persists over time.
In the following, I will introduce ﬁnancial intermediation into the economy and concentrate
on the deposit market equilibrium and the resulting allocation of funds in the risky technology. I
will use the result above and assume henceforth that the access to the risky technology is free of
charge. Since the demand for funds on the side of entrepreneurs is absolutely price-elastic, we will
only need to study the supply of funds, or equilvalently the demand for the risky asset, to obtain
the equilibrium allocation X∗
t of funds in the risky investment project.
III. Intermediated economy
Assumethemarket placedescribedabovedoesnot exist, or theaccess toitinduceshightransaction
costs for the agents.
2 This justiﬁes the existence of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Assume, ﬁnancial
intermediation is present in the model in the form of banks, which belong to producers in equal
shares, and the property rights are transferred from generation to generation through bequests.
Banks are operated by managers who constitute a negligeably small part of the population. The
banking sector is assumed to be competitive and consisting of a continuum of banks distributed at
the interval [0,1].
Assume there exists a regulatory authority which is responsible for bailouts or liquidation
of banks. A bailout is performed through subsidization, and presumes paying out the debts of the
bank to its depositors. If a bank is bailed out, its charter is continued for the next period. Liqui-
dation means closure of an insolvent bank and transferring its liquidation value to the depositors
2 A special example for such costs would be an asymmetry of information, such that an agent i does not know
whether another agent j is entrepreneur or consumer, but can obtain this information at some costs.
This would make ﬁnding a counterpart for a loan contract costly.
9indemnifying the banks’ debts.
If in period t +1a bank is insolvent, the regulator may opt to bail it out. To do this, the
regulator collects taxes from generation t +1and subsidizes the bank so that the bank obtains
enough funds to repay the depositors of generation t. Under this scheme, depositors of generation
t do not internalize the costs of the bailout. In general, the regulator does not promise to save the
banks unambiguously, but rather announces some probability of bailouts z.
A. Sequence of Events
Consider two subsequent periods t−1 and t.I np e r i o dt−1, consumers of generation t−1 decide
upon the composition of their investment portfolio: part at−1 of their unit initial endowment is
deposited with a bank, and part (1 − at−1) is invested in the risk-free asset. Simultaneously, the
bank decides upon the amount of deposits Dt−1 it wishes to collect at interest rate rD
t ( t h i si st h e
interest rate, which determines the repayment to the depositors in period t, this explains the time-
index), and upon the optimal composition of its ﬁnancial portfolio: share xt−1 of the collected
deposits is invested in the risky production technology, and share (1 − xt−1) is invested in the
risk-free asset.
The production takes place between periods t−1 and t according to (1). In the beginning of
period t, the state of nature for this period is known to all agents.
If portfolio gains of t h eb a n ki np e r i o dt are not below the total amount due to depositors
of period t − 1, the bank is solvent. The bank repays on deposits of period t − 1 and pays any
accruing dividends to its shareholders of generation t−1. The property rights are transferred from
the generation t − 1 to the generation t. Consumers of generation t make their decisions similarly
to their predecessors in period t − 1 as described above and deposit with the bank. Finally, the
bank invests in the production technology, and the economy proceeds to period t +1 .
If the portfolio gains of the bank in the period t are below the total amount to be repaid to
the depositors of generation t − 1, the bank is insolvent. An insolvency resolution takes place.
If the bank is liquidated, the value of its portfolio is transferred to the depositors of generation
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Figure 1. Sequence of events in intermediated economy
replace the liquidated one. The new bank belongs to the producers of generation t. Consumers of
generation t repeat the decision-making of the preceeding generation. The bank invests and the
economy proceeds to period t +1 .
If the insolvent bank is not liquidated, it is bailed out through a subsidy. The regulator
collects taxes from generation t to subsidize the bank in period t. The bank repays to depositors of
generation t − 1. Property rights are transferred to generation t, the decision-making takes place
as above, the bank invests and the economy proceeds to period t +1 .
The sequence of events is presented in Figure 1. The rhombi in denote the nodes, in which
the development of events can follow different scenarios. The ﬁrst rhombus determines the ﬁrst
scenario (a solvent bank repays its depositors) and the way to the second and third scenarios (if the
bank is insolvent). The second rhombus distinguishes between the second scenario (an insolvent
bank is bailed out through a subsidy ﬁnanced via taxes collected from the consumers of the new
generation) and the third scenario (an insolvent bank is liquidated). If the bank is subsidized, the
arrow leads back to the solvency-check rhombus. After the bank has obtained the subsidy, it is
able to repay its depositors of generation t−1, and, hence, is solvent. Further events develop as in
the case of solvency: the property rights are transferred from the generation t−1 to the generation
t. If the bank is liquidated, its value is paid to the depositors of generation t − 1, and no property
11rights can be transferred to generation t+1. However, in the latter case, generation t establishes a
new banking system so that in all three scenarios, there is again a banking system which belongs
to generation t. The consumers of generation t deposit and invest in the risk-free technology. The
banking system invests and the events repeat.
In Figure 1, the banking system in period t is split into two parts: ﬁrst, into the banking
system, which still belongs to the old generation (generation t−1), and secondly, into the banking
system, which belongs to the new generation t. If the banking system is solvent, the rhombus
"Solvent?" switches to "+", the deposits of generation t−1 are repaid, and members of generation
t − 1 transfer their property rights to generation t. As a result, the banking system now belongs to
the generation t. If the banking system is insolvent, the rhombus "Solvent?" switches to "-", and
the decision regarding closure is made. If the regulator decides to liquidate the banks, the rhombus
"Closure?" switches to "+", and the consumers of generation t−1 obtain the portfolio value of the
banks. Liquidation cancels the property rights so that generation t−1 cannot transfer any property
rights to generation t. Generation t has to create a new banking system with which it deposits.
Finally, if the regulator decides to bail the banks out, the rhombus "Closure?" switches to "-", and
taxes are collected from generation t,w h i c hi ss h o w nw i t ht h er e s p e c tive dashed arrow. Note that
this ﬂow of funds is only possible if the rhombus "Closure?" is switched to "-". Otherwise, the
oval "Tax collection" is not switched on, and the dashed arrow corresponding to the taxation and
subsidization is interrupted. If the banks obtain the subsidy, the rhombus "Solvent?" is switched to
"+" so that the ﬂow of funds to the consumers of generation t−1 is now possible, and they obtain
their deposits repaid in full. They can now transfer the property rights to generation t so that the
same banking system belongs now to generation t.
We can deﬁne the state-contingent rate of return e r
st+1
t+1 (st+1 ∈ {H,L}) as the rate of return,
which the bank obtains in period t +1on the investment made in period t in a ﬁnancial portfolio





xtrH +( 1− xt)rF if st+1 = H
xtrL +( 1− xt)rF if st+1 = L (8)
Remember, rH and rL are parameters and do not change over time.
12A bank is solvent if e r
st+1
t+1 >r D . If the banks in period t +1are insolvent, the regulator can
intervene and bail out the banks. If the bailout is performed (which probability is z), depositors
receive their deposits in full with interest accrued. If, however, the bailout is not performed, the
banks are liquidated and the repayments to depositors are determined by the value of banks’ assets
in period t+1. Depositors are informed about the values of p, z and the share of the risky asset in
banks’ portfolios xt so that they can form expectations about future repayments on deposits, given
the announced deposit rate rD
t+1.
B. Supply of Deposits
Consumers of generation t maximize their expected gains from investing into the risk-free technol-
ogy and into a deposit contract at the interest rate rD













































The ﬁrst term in this function is the expected payoff to depositors if the regulator bails out
the bank. The second and the third terms correspond to the case without bailouts.
Optimization problem (7) determines the optimal share a∗
t of deposits in the portfolio of
consumers. Remember, the group of consumers has a unit mass and may be thought as being dis-
tributed on the interval [0;1]. Each consumer possesses a unit initial endowment. Total (aggregate)











Proposition 1 If the regulator bails out banks with probability z, the aggregate deposit supply in






















rF − rL¢ (12)
To prove the proposition it sufﬁces to substitue in (10) for e r
st+1
t+1 from (8) and to solve opti-
mzation problem (9). Doe to linearity of the objective function of depositors in at, the solution is
straightforward. Equation (11) guarantees that the solution is the aggregate deposit supply func-
tion. The interest rate expression in (12) follows from the equality of the expected deposit rate of
return to the risk-free one. For simplicity, it is assumed that if the two rates are equal, consumers
still deposit the whole their endowment with the bank.
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C. Demand for deposits
Banks do not internalize the costs of bailouts, since it is the next generation, who is charged with
taxes to subsidize the banks. This results in the limited liability of banks in each state of the nature.
Itshouldbenotedthatifabankisinsolventandsubsidized, itsproﬁtiszero. Theobjectivefunction



























s.t. 0 ≤ xt ≤ 1
0 ≤ Dt
The solution to this optimization problem determines the each competitive bank’s demand






of each competitive bank
3 This assumption may be justiﬁed through inﬁnitesimal costs of access to the risk-free investment project.




























t+1 <r H (16)
As soon as deposit interest rate is below rH, banks expect strictly positive proﬁt from each
unit invested in the risky asset. The reason for that is that under limited liability, the worst outcome
for banks is zero, but the best one is given by the rate of return rH, which appears with strictly
positive probability p. The linearity of the objective function implies that the demand of banks for
deposits is unlimited, and the share invested in the risky asset is 1. If, however, rD
t+1 ≥ rH holds,
then expected proﬁt of banks is zero independetly of the decision of banks. Therefore, banks are
indifferent with regards to the amount of deposits accumulated and to the composition of their
portfolios.
D. Equilibrium
One can deﬁne temporary competitive equilibrium in a following way:












































In the equilibrium in period t, the competitive interest rate on deposits rD
c,t+1 is settled at the













of deposits given the optimal
decisionofthebankswithregardtotheirportfoliocompositionx∗
t. Thisdeterminestheequilibrium
investment in the risky technology X∗
t .
Proposition 2 If the regulator commits to bail out banks with probability z, there exist multiple











Under competition, limited liability of banks leads to excessive equilibrium interest rate.
This justiﬁes the general critique of the bailout policy as propagating moral hazard in banking.
Though there is no explicit moral hazard in my model, it still demonstrates that competitive banks
set the deposit interest rate higher than the expected rate of return from investment in the risky
technology. A stochastic bailout rule fails to solve the problem of excessive interest rates, if there
is no internalization of bailout costs by banks. Moreover, since banks have no incentives to invest
all collected deposits into risky technology, the link between creditors (consumers) and borrowers
(entrepreneurs) may be partially or completely broken in all equilibria with X∗
t ∈ [0;1).T h e
following section shows that regulatory forbearance may ensure internalization of bailout costs by
banks and thus improve the allocational efﬁciency of the intermediated economy.
IV. Regulatory Forbearance
Regulatory forbearance is a delay in the liquidation of an insolvent bank. In contrast to bailouts,
forbearance does not require the action of the regulator to be ﬁnanced through the taxes or in some
other way, as it is in the case of subsidization. If the regulator does not liquidate an insolvent bank,
it is stillpossible that thebank obtains enough deposits from thenewgeneration to repay thedepos-
itors of the previous one. One can see it as workout incentives of the future generations. This may
require some guarantees from the regulator which would allow to avoid bank runs. Since banks
w o u l ds t a r tt h en e x tp e r i o dw i t hl o s s e s ,t h et o t al amount of funds in the economy will be lower
than in the current period. The dynamics of equilibria may then be non-trivial. For the analysis of
intertemporal effects in such a case see Allen and Gale (1997), Mavrotas and Vinogradov (2005)
and Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2006). This paper, in contrast, focuses on the decision-making
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Figure 2. Sequence of events in the intermediated economy: regulatory forbearance
A. Sequence of Events
The sequence of events in case of forbearance is shown in Figure 2. The main difference between
ﬁgures 1 and 2 is that the regulator does not decide whether to baioult or to liquidate, but rather
decides whether to delay the liquidation in a hope for a turnaround. If the regulator forbears,
a transfer of funds between the new generation and the old generation is possible through the
banking system. Previously, such a transfer was only possible in the form of a subsidy ﬁnanced
through taxes from the young gen e r a t i o na n dp a i dt ot h eb a n k i n gs y s t e mi no r d e rt oe n a b l ei t
to repay the deposits to the old generation. Now these are the deposits of the young generation,
which may be used by the banking system to repay the old depositors. In the timing of events, ﬁrst,
the new deposits are collected, and only then are the old depositors repaid. The intergenerational
transfer of funds is shown by the dashed arrow between the banking system belonging to the new
generation and the banking system belonging to the old generation in Figure 2. Note that if the
rhombus "Closure?" is switched to "+", this transfer of funds is interrupted, since the oval "Funds
transfer" is switched off. In this case, the banking system which belonged to generation t − 1
is liquidated, no property rights are transferred to generation t, and the new banking system is
created.
B. Supply of Deposits
The consumers of each generation are informed that the regulator can delay the bankruptcy pro-
17cedure with probability z. For depositors this means that their bank continues its operations, and
would repay deposits in full at the expense of the future generation. This results in the same deposit






















rF − rL¢ (18)
Note that now z denotes the probability of the regulatory forbearance.
C. Demand for Deposits
If an insolvent bank is not liquidated, the bank starts the next period with losses. This stresses
the difference between insolvency and illiquidity: in the setting here, an insolvent bank may still
be liquid due to workout incentives of the future generations. If, however, the bank is liquidated,
then the limited liability holds. An important issue is whether the bank takes the future losses into
account in its objective function. Formally, since the shareholders of the bank transfer the property
rights after their deposits are repaid, they do not face losses. If the bank only maximized the proﬁt
of its current shareholders, it shou l da g a i nc o u n to nt h el i m i t e dl i a bility and no internalization of
bailout-liquidation costs occurs. However, the bank continues with the new generation of share-
holders, which is worse off if the losses occur. If the management of the bank (which I refer to as
"bankers") is concerned with the wealth of both generations of the shareholders, it should take the
future losses into consideration when determining the optimal strategy of the bank.
4
To summarize, in each period, the bank maximizes it’s expected proﬁt of the next period
and internalizes the costs of bailout. The bailout is seen as a workout by the next generation of
depositors, who provide the bank with the funds needed to cover the bank’s obligations before the
previous generation of depositors. The internalization implies that the principle of the limited lia-
bility is not valid for the bank, if the regulator forbears and lets the bank to continue its operations.
4 Thiseffectcouldbecomemoreclearifoneconsiderslonglivedagents, whomakemyopicdecisions. Thenthe"new
generation" of shareholders is effectively the same group of shareholders as before. The usage of the
term "generation" is then justiﬁed only with the necessity to distinguish between the decisions made
by the same agents in different periods. In such a case, it would be obvious that the bank does not
count on the limited liability in case of forbearance, since its losses obviously make its shareholders
worse off. An alternative way could also be an inroduction of agents, who live over three periods. Then
there always exists a part of the bank’s shareholders, who suffer from losses, so that the bank has to
internalize the losses. I prefer to stay within a single framework throughout the entire paper, and do not alter the model.
18Therefore, if the bank is not closed, it may experience losses, which is a consequence of unlimited
liability.
Now, the objective function of the bank in each period t takes into account the possibility of
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prH + z (1 − p)rL¢ (22)
Comparing the bank’s choice (21-22) with its choice under stochastic bailouts (16-15), one
obtains that the internalization of costs induced by the forbearance policy of the regulator reﬂects
in a more cautionary behavior of banks: banks only wish to acquire deposits at a lower interest rate
than before.
D. Equilibrium
To determine the competitive equilibrium in period t in line with deﬁnition 2, we again need to
satisfy the condition Dd = Ds. Since banks internalize now bailout costs, they operate under the
assumption of unlimited liability, which eliminates excessively high interest rates and ensures the
link between creditors and borrowers. The following proposition establishes this fact:
Proposition 3 If the regulator pursues forbearance in period t +1with probability z ∈ (0,1],












prH + z (1 − p)rL¢ (23)
Note that as z approaches 0, this equilibrium is very similar to the competitive equilibrium
under stochastic bailouts with no internalization of bailout costs by banks (limited liability). With
z → 0, the competitive equilibrium is unique and is characterized by the interest rate rD
c → rH.
T h ei n t u i t i o nb e h i n dt h i si st h a tw i t he v e nav e r ys m all probability of the bailout, the banks still
(partially) internalize the costs of insolvency, and this prevents deposit interest rate from being
excessively high. If z =0 , banks operate under limited liability, and the result (17) holds.
If z =1 , the competitive banking sector offers deposit interest rate exactly at the level of the
expected rate of return of the risky asset. In the bailout case above this was impossible.
To summarize, regulatory forbearance may have a positive effect if the current generation
of depositors believes in workout incentives of future generations, which ensure full repayment
on the deposits. This positive effect has two dimensions: ﬁrst, it is the allocational efﬁciency,
and second, it is the prevention of excessively high interest rates in the competitive banking sec-
tor. It is important that under forbearance banks internalize insolvency costs, otherwise the effect
disappears.
V. Constructive Ambiguity
Tha analysis above assumed that both depositors and banks are informed about the probability
of liquidation (1 − z). What would happen if this does not hold? If the regulator pursues an
ambiguous policy, the true information about such probability distribution is not known to the
agents. The decision-making under ambiguity is then based upon beliefs of the agents, which
must not be symmetric even if they exhibit the same degree of pessimism/optimism. If we assume
that both depositors and bankers are pessimistic, they should count for the worst possible outcome
(see. e.g. Chateauneuf et al., 2006). The worst possible outcome for depositors takes place if
20the insolvent bank is liquidated immediately, which corresponds to the case z =0 .I n t h i sc a s e
depositors obtain only the liquidation value of the bank, i.e. the value of its portfolio. Substituting






















rF − rL¢ (24)
The worst possible outcome for bankers is, however, the policy of forbearance, since in this
case banks work under unlimited liability and may experience losses. If bankers count for z =1 ,
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(26)
The resulting equilbrium is straightforward:
Proposition 4 If the regulator follows ambiguous bailout policy, and the beliefs of depositors
and bankers with regards to forbearance are extremely asymmetric, the temporary competitive
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(28)
This proposition demonstrates that if the investment risk (as measured by 1 − p)i sh i g h
enough, the intermediated economy fails to link creditors and borrowers and experiences desin-
termediation. The reason for that is that both bankers and depositors are pessimistic and exhibit
cautionary behavior. Depositors expect an insolvent bank to be liquidated and a higher deposit
interest rate is needed to make the deposit supply positive. Bankers expect not to be closed, and
face unlimited liability. Their desire to avoid losses leads to a lower deposit interest rate than
the one acceptable for depositors. As a result, ambiguity in the regulatory policy may lead to an
equilibrium allocation, which does not replicate the one attainable in the market economy. The
proposition is illustrated in Figure ??, which depicts demand and supply of deposits under both
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Figure 3. Equilibrium under ambiguity
In a dynamic setting, beliefs may be updated from period to period. One can expect that the
updating process converges to some probabilistic rule, even if the regulator does not follow any. In
this case, the asymmetry in beliefs can disappear, and both depositors and bankers would believe
that liquidation will be performed with some probability (1 − z), which can be understood as the
ratio of average number of liquidations to the average number of insolvencies per period over a
sufﬁciently large number of periods.
However, if the probability of liquidation (1 − z) is known, it is not clear, what happens
in "no liquidation" case. The analysis above shows that there is a difference between the case in
which an insolvent bank is bailed out at the expense of future generations, or when it is allowed to
continue in a hope of a turnaround (regulatory forbearance). In both cases, depositors are repaid
in full, but the decision-making by banks is different, and it may again lead to allocational inefﬁ-
ciency if banks do not internalize the insolvency costs. This argument stresses that the policy of
"constructive ambiguity" cannot be completely ambiguos and some signal to the public regarding
the insolvency resolution procedure is desired.
Another issue is whether beliefs of bankers and depositors converge to the same probabilistic
rule? If they follow the same updating process then the answer is "yes". However it is unclear
whether the beliefs of depositors and bankers follow the same updating process. This is especially
unclear if the signal from the regulator is observed by depositors and bankers differently. In such
22a case, we obtain asymmetry in beliefs combined with the asymmetry in information, and it is
hard to imagine that there exists some updating rule which would help depositors to reveal the true
information from the past observations.
So was Bagehot right after all, when he argued that banking regulators should follow a pre-
cise bailout-liquidation rule?
5 The answer to this question depends on the way one understands the
"preciseness" of the bailout rule. Not only commitment to liquidation and commitment to bailouts,
but also their stochastic combination may be harmful for the economy, if banks do not internalize
the costs of insolvency. This could be an argument i nf a v o ro fc o n s t r u c t i v ea m b i g u i t y .A tt h es a m e
time, excessive ambiguity can also be harmful for the economy, since asymmetry in beliefs of the
public can lead to disintermediation. Stochastic forbearance, instead, offers a possibility to create
internalization of insolvency costs by banks, but does not lead to a cautionary behavior of deposi-
tors, so that disintermediation does not occur, and the system of ﬁnancial intermediaries performs
its role of channelling funds from creditors to borrowers.
VI. Summary
A stochastic (probabilistic) bailout rule does not necessarily lead to the internalization of insol-
vency costs by banks. An example of this is the case in which the bailouts are ﬁnanced by future
generations. In this case, intermediation may be inefﬁcient. On the one hand, this stresses the need
for a design of the bailout policy which would provide for the internalization of insolvency costs
by banks. On the other hand, it is desirable that depositors do not internalize the costs of bailouts,
otherwise they exhibit cautionary behaviour, which can again lead to inefﬁcient intermediation or
to disintermediation. Forbearance provides a convenient tool to make depositors less cautionary in
their choice.
Uncertainty with respect to insolvency resolutions is one of the pillars of the constructive
ambiguity. Another pillar is uncertainty in the timing of bailouts, which leads to the regulatory
forbearance. Regulatory forbearancemayhelptoachievetheefﬁciency of ﬁnancialintermediation,
5 "Was Bagehot right after all?" is the second title of the paper by Rochet and Vives (2004) and refers
to Bagehot’s (1873) suggestion that a bailout-liquidation policy of the regulator should follow a precise rule.
23but only if depositors believe in intergenerational workout incentives, which ensure the inﬂow of
deposits into the banking system in each period. Forbearance induces internalization of losses
by banks, and intergenerational workout incentives eliminate internalization of bailout costs by
current depositors. Under such conditions, uncertainty with regard to the timing of bailout may
promote the allocational efﬁciency of ﬁnancial intermediation.
If the regulator follows an ambiguous policy of insolvency resolutions, an asymmetry in
beliefs of depositors and bankers may arise with respect to whether insolvent banks are liquidated
or bailed out. If depositors believe insolvent banks to be liquidated, and the bankers believe them
to be allowed to operate further, a situation may appear, in which the banking system provides
a different allocation of resources in risky and riskless projects than the one in the market-based
economy. An extreme case is disintermediation, when households do not deposit with banks but
rather invest their whole endowment in the risk-free asset.
Animportantpolicyimplicationoftheanalysisinthispaperisthatthepolicyof"constructive
ambiguity"shouldnotbetooambiguous. Itisimportantthatbothbankersanddepositorsreceivean
identical signal from the regulator, which would ensure their identical beliefs with regards to future
insolvency resolutions. This does not imply that the regulator has to commit either to commitment
or to liquidation, and still Bagehot (1873) was right: the certain rule, which the regulator should
follow, is a stochastic combination of liquidation, bailouts and forbearance. If this rule is known
to the public, this contributes to the allocational efﬁciency of the intermediated economy.
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